

R

no

STANDARD FORM NO. 64  
10 AUG 1981

SECURITY INFORMATION

COPY 1 OF 14 COPIES

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Office Memorandum

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
REVIEWED BY  
TO  
FROM  
DATE  
REASON(S)  
FOR  
ENDORSE EXISTING MARKINGS  
DECLASSIFIED  
RELEASE DENIED  
PA or OF EXEMPTED

Mr. Nitze

Mr. Halle

China Policy.

DATE: 2/4/53  
February 4, 1953

Chen

The Secretary has said that President Eisenhower will find ways to make the Peiping regime want to call off hostilities in Korea and Indochina. The "deneutralization" of Formosa can contribute to the attainment of this objective. It would not contribute to it, however, if our Chinese opponents had no assurance that the threat implicit in our support of Chiang could be relieved by their acceptance of our terms in Korea and Indochina. In the absence of such assurance, we would be in the position of a man who tries to get his adversary to surrender by threatening to shoot him if he doesn't, but who allows him to believe that he will also shoot him if he does. We would be embarked, in effect, on a policy of "unconditional surrender" leading to the requirement of total military defeat.

The minimum assurance needed would be that of our recognition, in case our terms were met, of the Peiping regime's de facto government on the Chinese mainland, and the consequent limitation of our intervention in the Chinese Civil War to the protection of Formosa. The objection to offering such assurance may be the present state of American public opinion. President Eisenhower today occupies, however, a position of positive leadership and he could, I think, take public opinion along with him--especially in view of the general desire not to see the Far Eastern fighting continued unnecessarily or extended.

A premise of the proposal put forward here is that we could not re-establish Chiang in the effective government of China without an excessive commitment of our resources (although it might be possible for us to lay a foundation for an eventual "Titoist" defection of the Peiping regime). If this is right, the alternative to the proposal seems to be that of getting ourselves politically and militarily deadlocked in the Far East. Such a deadlock would surely bring about a gradual increase in the commitment of our military resources without leading to a solution.

S/P:LHalle:bh;nrs

SECURITY INFORMATION  
SECRET